THE USUAL SITUATION IN ECONOMETRIC INFERENCE is that, at least asymptotically, Bayesian probability statements about the unknown parameters conditional on the data are very similar to classical confidence statements about the probability of random intervals covering the true value of the parameter. In time series models with possible unit roots this is not true. In an earlier paper (Sims (1988) ) one of the authors of this paper made this point and argued that Bayesian inference for such models was more sensible, as well as much easier to handle analytically, than the classical confidence statements.
Many economists are not used to having to make careful distinctions between probability statements about the location of unknown parameters conditional on the data (Bayesian, or posterior statements) and probability statements about the behavior of statistics in repeated samples conditional on the parameter values (classical confidence, or pre-sample statements). The earlier paper included an example that aimed at guiding intuition about these distinctions, but the example used discrete data and had no evident connection to the unit root time series context. This paper explores in more detail the distinction between confidence statements and probability statements about parameters, in a simple time series model that may show a unit root.
We One-tailed tests of a unit-root null hypothesis against p < 1 using the appropriate classical distribution theory always accept the null more easily than would tests based on the usual t distribution for the same statistic. Flat-prior Bayesian analysis leads to the usual t tests for generation of posterior probabilities even in dynamic nonstationary models. Therefore use of marginal significance levels under the correct classical distribution theory as if they were posterior probabilities corresponds to using a Bayesian prior distribution which favors larger values of p. Since much applied work presents p-values computed with the special unit-root distribution theory, it is useful to know the nature of the prior required to justify treating them as posterior probabilities. We compute these priors-there are many, one for each possible observed value of ^p.
We discuss the implications for practice of the need to distinguish pre-sample from posterior probabilities in dynamic regression models. Our conclusion is that in reporting results or in making decisions about whether to simplify models by differencing, allowing for co-integration, etc. there is no reason to use the special sampling distribution theory generated under the null hypothesis that unit roots are present. The conventional test statistics and distributions for them retain the same interpretation as descriptors of the likelihood in dynamic as in static regressions. Even statisticians and econometricians uncomfortable with this conclusion should agree that the shape of the likelihood is interesting and that therefore conventional "uncorrected" p values should be reported alongside the special ones based on unit root null hypotheses. there is no one-dimensional way to summarize the sample evidence. In order to develop insight into the relation between Bayesian and classical inference, it is helpful to simplify the situation further. We will consider the situation where one cannot observe the full sample-only p$. We also assume S.2 = 1 and is known.2 These simplifying assumptions make the shape of the likelihood nonnormal and difficult to derive. Their appeal is only that they make the Bayesian analytical framework consist of a two-dimensional joint p.d.f., that of p and p$. A function of two arguments is easily visualized as a surface in three dimensions, while a function of three arguments is much harder to visualize.
We can be sure in advance that the likelihood will remain symmetric in p around a peak p$, because conditional on 5 it has these properties and it therefore will not lose them when 5f is integrated out.
In the next section we will proceed to construct, by Monte Carlo, an estimated joint p. for all samples, the assumption of a particular known value for (r2 plays no role. We assert it only because the argument as to why it plays no role would take up space and because our choice of cr2 could make some numerical difference to someone trying to replicate our results. 
